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Introduction
The political and economic transformation in Georgia over the past twenty years is nothing short of phenomenal, and should provide hope to any struggling nation that is attempting to modernize. Few could have predicted that a former Soviet state could distance itself from its socialist culture in less than a generation.
1 Though progress continues, for Georgia to achieve its long-term vision of full Western integration, it must first reestablish a normalized relationship with Russia. This renewal of diplomatic relations must begin now, and with an optimistic outlook, it could ultimately resolve the Abkhazia and Ossetia occupation. Georgia has momentum and will continue its path to prosperity, but progress will be more productive if
Russia is not motivated to interfere or hinder progress.
Recent political instability in Russia 2 and its upcoming presidential elections in March 2012
represent an outstanding opportunity for Georgia to begin the dialog. This situation is not a time for Georgia to take advantage of a distracted Kremlin. It is long past the time for Georgia to eliminate its overt anti-Russian campaign, soften its public Western rhetoric and embark on a new partnership with Russia. It is important to sustain the positive momentum established during the Russian WTO accession negotiations, and to use the agreement as a springboard to increase goodwill with their northern neighbor. It may seem counter-intuitive for Georgia to emphasize political engagement with Russia during a time when Federation leadership is occupied by higher strategic priorities such as regime survival and economic stability. However, what better time to build relationships than to offer an olive branch when your antagonist is challenged with upheaval and insecurity, and faces the loss of allies and influence in the Middle East? 3 Libyan allegiances are now unknown and Syria and Iran are both under intense domestic 2 or international pressure that threatens their regimes. All could be considered former or current Russian allies. The personal animosity cultivated over the past eight years between Putin and Saakashvili may also telegraph to some that any rapprochement effort should be delayed until the results of the 2012 Russian and 2013 Georgian presidential elections are final, but why wait?
The pace of world developments has accelerated greatly, and this window of opportunity is narrow. The strategic situation does not measurably differ between the two countries, even if their leaders do change as a result of elections, so delay offers little benefit. Filow Morar wrote about frozen conflicts: "Time does not necessarily positively contribute to conflict resolution and protracted conflicts are constantly germinating new outcomes and realities, which foments new instances for discontent and conflict." 4 Though some may believe that with strategic patience, Georgia may be able to "wait-out" Russia due to its demographic decline, 5 Russia"s energy reserves and intellectual capital give it an excellent foundation to reverse this trend. 6 The geographic reality is that Georgia will never enjoy real security without positive engagement with Russia, no matter how much time elapses. The initiative must come from Georgia. Russia has little incentive to engage Georgia or to make the country more stable, especially now that the WTO hurdle appears to be cleared and Georgia has little leverage at its disposal. Most risks (and potential benefits) of engagement with the Kremlin rest predominantly upon the Georgian people and their leadership, but it is an acceptable and necessary risk. Rebuilding relations with Russia should not alienate Western aid providers, and should serve to improve Georgia"s standing with its Western partners.
Russia's South Caucasus Policy
Vladimir Putin"s foreign policy has been marked by establishment of a sphere of influence along Russia"s borders, and this policy is codified in official Federation documents. 7 Georgia should acknowledge that its quality of life will be better with a friendly, but steady Russia, than if it exclusively leans West and continues the antagonistic relationship with their neighbor. It seems a daunting task to achieve Western standards with an aggravated Russia fomenting endless regional instability. This ultimately hinders development and suppresses foreign direct investment. Given the current lack of Western focus on the region, and the lack of Western security assurances (other than financing, training and equipping Georgian forces specifically linked to the Afghanistan mission), Georgia should have plenty of incentive to engage the Kremlin. The lack of political leverage by the EU to measurably influence Russia with soft power also signals that Georgia must accept the inevitability of Russian interference if their relationship remains hostile. Georgia can aspire to Western standards, but they will come much more slowly under the stress of a hostile relationship with Russia, preventing more abundant trade in the region.
As distasteful as establishing positive relations with Russia may seem to many Georgians, a powerful, stable Russia is in their best interest. This applies even if it means Georgia"s control of their occupied regions in Ossetia and Abkhazia is a distant dream. For practical purposes, they have not had effective control of these regions since the early 1990s. 13 Focusing on deoccupation and prodding Russia drains resources and hinders foreign investment that could be used to improve the lives of the Georgian people in other ways. A weaker Russia may be more likely to be an irrational/aggressive actor, 14 which could again attempt to manifest its influence and restore perceived lost prestige through military means rather than diplomatic, economic or energy supply pressure. 15 Russian weakness could also embolden many other simmering, but currently more subdued disputes in its regions. If Russia weakens and loses more control of the North Caucasus, for example, former North Caucasus "friends" of Georgia could become problematic, with the elimination of Russia as their common enemy.
Potential Areas of Shared Interests and Risks
There are Georgian risks to an engagement, but ultimately the potential benefits outweigh those risks. Russia could rebuff Georgian overtures, then blame Georgia more intensely for internal Russian problems, arguing Georgians are sabotaging Russia out of revenge for the diplomatic riff. Russian media outlets also insinuate Georgia may assist "terrorists" to disrupt the Olympics (but have provided no proof). But Georgia must still make the effort to engage. Cooperation Organization charter 19 and some of its sub-institutions. 20 The wars in Chechnya were merely one concern of many, and the North Caucasus instability continues to be a focal point of the Russian leadership. The visa regime is a sound policy that brings income into the Georgian economy, 25 but helps to stoke Russian concerns that Georgia may be aiding North Caucasus separatist groups, and therefore increases tensions. It would be prudent to issue visa-free travel to ALL Russians, or visa-required travel for ALL Russians, but separating out citizens of Russia"s most volatile 9 regions for special treatment only makes the situation more complicated and increases Russia"s suspicion of the outreach effort.
Another possible option to assuage Russian security concerns is to establish a bi-lateral security agreement with Russia for intelligence sharing, similar to the system set up between Russia and its Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) peers. Created in 2004, it is called the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, and allows SCO nations to exchange information on terrorist suspects. 26 It facilitates detention and transfer of suspects between SCO nations, and has been compared to some C.I.A. programs administered by the United States. 27 Georgia should only seek defensive weapons useful for internal defense rather than weapons to defend from external threats, reducing tensions with Russia. If they are convinced they must have more substantial defensive arms, they should consider Russian armaments, so long as their acquisition does not measurably interfere with eventual NATO interoperability. NATO"s enlargement requirement indicates a nation must work to achieve interoperability, but it is not a requirement before admission. 28 Though new NATO nations may have suspended most new equipment purchases from Russia, many NATO members still have residual Soviet era equipment that still permits NATO interoperability. This would be a goodwill gesture, to reduce the impact of declining Russian military hardware sales due to lost defense contracts, such as with Libya. Though the arms acquired may not potentially measure up technologically to Western equivalents, they should be sufficient to handle internal disruptions. The weapons are also sufficient for missions such as border protection, should conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupt into a significant refugee situation, or should Iran"s political stability cause unrest. There is no need to buy the best military equipment if "good enough" accomplishes the task.
As far back as the 1990s during the Chechen wars, Russia has considered Georgia a supporter of North Caucasus unrest. Russia considered Georgia a safe-haven for combatants during these wars. 29 Georgia must take action to reverse their reputation as historical supporters of unrest. Georgia should immediately cease its overt public efforts to engage the North Caucasus at the expense of Russian stability. Though there are many reasons unrelated to
Chechnya for the animosity that exists between Russia and Georgia, this remains a significant friction point. Georgia should remove anti-Russian rhetoric from their television programming on their First Caucasian network, intended for North Caucasus audiences as well as domestic, and stick to positive messages about Georgia and its opportunities. Finally, the Georgian Parliament should not put forth any additional legislation aimed at humiliating or antagonizing Russia. The country should leave designations of genocide to impartial historians and not domestic politicians.
Assist with the 2014 Sochi Olympics
Georgia has consistently alleged that Russia is pillaging the resources of Abkhazia to provide the raw materials necessary to prepare for the Sochi Olympics in 2014. 30 Additionally, they have made claims that Russia is leaving significant environmental damage in its wake with its deforestation, cement production pollution and construction waste as a result of these efforts. 
Address Russian Concerns about Restored Prestige and NATO
A recent Russian newscast indicated that if the United States or Israel attack Iran, the next domino to fall, counter to their strategic interests, will be Georgia and Azerbaijan joining NATO.
Even with a consistent force reduction trajectory in NATO, on-going for decades, and significant U.S. cuts announced to military spending and combat brigades being withdrawn from Europe, into the Caucasus region. 35 Despite the potential that Georgia in NATO could actually be beneficial for Russia, resulting in more stability on its southern border, the issue is not likely to change, even in the long term.
The real NATO threat to Russia is psychological and symbolic, but it is a situation that Georgia must consider. If NATO expands to the Caucasus, it won"t change the likelihood that NATO will attack Russia (current probability at near zero), 36 but Russians may perceive it as "decline" from their Soviet days. 37 They have demanded a "near-abroad" and NATO inclusion of Georgia would be a direct implication that Russia has limited International influence. Georgia must appreciate the position faced by NATO countries, who seek to minimize unrest in the entire world, not just the Caucasus. Georgia should not cease its aspiration to formally join NATO, but it should cease its overt rhetoric. It should engage opportunities to align itself with NATO standards for potential future admission, but more quietly. It is feasible to aspire and take action to achieve NATO standards without formal admission into the organization. Though Russia may be uncomfortable with the U.S. training Georgian forces (demonizing the training and equipping plays well in domestic politics), they must assuredly understand that it is for securing the situation in Afghanistan, which is in their best interest. Russia will continue to tolerate it. Georgia should continue to seek EU political and economic expertise for possible integration, but it should also become a less overt foreign policy objective. There appears a smaller risk in EU accession aggravating the Kremlin, as Russia appears more concerned about NATO than the EU. This could possibly be due to the EU"s lack of credible military capability and the political will to employ it.
Georgia should make the offer to Russia not to provide material support to any nation that attacks Iran. This is not only in Georgia"s interest from a Russian-relations perspective, but from an internal security perspective as well, given their proximity to Iran. They should do this to ensure they don"t become an Iranian or Iranian sympathizer"s target. The West would accept this reality and not fault the nation. This commitment would not hinder US interests or Western ability to conduct operations in the region, and may give Georgia political top-cover in the case of conflict. Since Georgia has no significant air defense, nations could use their airspace in emergency situations with no risk of air defense encounters.
Georgia should commit that no permanent NATO forces will be permitted on Georgian soil, except for training and exercise purposes. This would also be of no detriment to Western interests, since it is highly unlikely that NATO will admit Georgia in the foreseeable future, or 
Reduce Anti-Russian Antagonistic Rhetoric in Official Documents and Public Diplomacy
The Draft National Security Concept of Georgia, recently passed by Parliament, and waiting for Presidential signature, mentions Russia at least 30+ times in the first 8 pages alone (a 28-page document). 43 These references are typically not flattering. Georgia must drastically reduce the rhetoric, as it has resulted in no concrete gains from the international community. It seems that you cannot read an article referencing a Saakashvili speech without hearing about Russia. He seems the master of inserting the Kremlin into any discussion. Nations hear the words, but won"t likely change their policies simply because of Georgia"s consistent reminders of Russia"s aggression in 2008. Eventually, it becomes background noise with gradually diminishing impact.
Georgia should shift even more to "back-door" diplomacy, where they raise their points in private meetings rather than in public forums. Continued Georgian rhetoric gives Putin more domestic ammunition that the threat is constant and real from the Caucasus, NATO, and Georgia.
The rhetoric can be used to reinforce Russian claims that Georgia"s strategy and long-term goal is to destabilize Russia.
Facilitate Russian Energy Sector Security and Economic Modernization/Development
Russian leaders know they need to modernize and diversify their economy, 44 with a keen eye on current and future demographic challenges facing the nation. Conventional wisdom would indicate that fomenting instability in energy markets, therefore supporting higher energy prices, is the best mechanism to ensure sufficient revenues for Russia to effect this modernization.
However, Russia understands that political and economic instability (in Russia and the world)
causes capital flight and loss of foreign investors. 45 Georgia, with strong Western support, should continue to reinforce to Russia that peace is in both their economic interests. 46 Foreign investment and technology are needed for Russia to overcome its economic challenges. But no one will place resources there if the risk is perceived as too high. 47 Georgia can"t do anything to help the International community have more faith in Russian observance of the rule of law, but they can help contribute to a better perception of stability in Russia, starting with the South Caucasus. 48 As mentioned earlier, Russia has no significant geo-strategic incentive to normalize relations with Georgia. They have soldiers immediately south of the Caucasus mountain range, and likely want to keep them there. However, if détente between
Georgia and Russia will increase investor confidence and direct foreign investment increases as a result, there may be a sliver of hope for normalization. Resolution of the WTO impasse is already a step in that correct direction. Political stability would also improve as the foreign investment starts to materialize and both economies become stronger. Citizens want to see improvement in their lives and security on their borders, no matter where they live or what political system they aspire to join.
Georgia does not appear to offer much in the realm of geographic importance to Russia as an energy transit route to European markets. But if peace with Georgia makes Russia a more reliable energy source than the Middle East, it could slow the EU"s pressure for supply diversification, transition to LNG, and unbundling of energy supply vs energy transport companies, 49 all of which can cut into Russian energy profits or potentially reduce Russia"s EU energy market share. 50 No observers predicted that only three years after the war of 2008, Georgia would agree to Russian admission into the WTO. Yet, relatively soon after the war, there exists an agreement.
51
Georgian détente with Russia would make it more likely the Kremlin will adhere to the terms of the WTO Swiss-brokered agreement. Once Russia is admitted to the WTO, there are a limited number of procedures to remove them, even if Russia violates the Georgian agreement. Georgia gains nothing if Russia chooses to ignore the agreement. 52 There could be plenty of opportunities for Russia to subvert the agreements, if relations between the two nations remain strained.
Georgia should re-open the railway linking Russia and Armenia via Abkhazia. Not only for potentially receiving a customs income, but because it would reduce the isolation of Armenia and further stabilize the region and encourage more economic development. Turkey would most likely not consider this a threat or concern. Turkey recently initiated diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with Armenia over the past several years, and most observers recognize the initiative was a failure only because of Azerbaijan"s strong opposition, not Turkey"s lack of resolve. It is also likely that Turkey would view any initiatives that maintain political stability, and simultaneously increase economic opportunity for Turkey as a positive development.
Georgia may risk some Azeri pushback, but could seek ways to tie this rail opening into the greater WTO issue, and this could also actually stabilize the region. 53 Georgia should formally leave GUAM, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (Georgia/Ukraine/Azerbaijan/Moldova). This organization has become essentially irrelevant, 54 and could be perceived as an anti-Russian consortium. Dismantling it would be a sign of goodwill, since its creation was widely recognized as a counter to Russian interests. contribute to an expanding GDP. 57 Joining the customs union could also expand the income associated with Russian tourism. Though Russian tourism is growing in Georgia and represented 8% of their total visitors in 2010, 58 they could benefit greatly if they were able to attract many of the Russians that now extensively go to Turkey, 59 Abkhazia and other destinations.
Georgia may be able to assist Russia to mitigate the natural gas market"s paradigm shift to Liquefied Natural Gas, which has seen significant demand increase as nations have announced termination of nuclear energy programs. As competition increases in the gas market, LNG has the potential to interfere with Russia"s ability to sell its gas at profitable prices. Georgia could offer the port of Poti or Supsa for development to export Russian gas as LNG. 60 This could help Russia diversify its delivery options away from its principally fixed pipeline method, and better compete with the U.S. and others that are greatly expanding their gas extraction abilities.
Georgia could also offer to serve as a transit route for Russian gas to the already existing LNG facility at Ceyhan, Turkey. Georgia may then be able to negotiate lower gas prices from Russia as relations improve, though Georgian dependence on Russian gas has dropped significantly from 2008, to a current 14% of total imports. 61 More incentive for Georgia to move quickly, to become relevant in the Russian energy sector, is the recent Turkish approval of the South Stream pipeline. It is in the process of development after Turkey granted territorial rights to Russia to run the pipeline through its littoral areas of the Black Sea. 62 There is some professional debate about whether this pipeline will come to fruition, since some see it as an economic ploy to coerce Ukraine into selling its pipeline system to Russia.
If this pipeline is actually built, with current estimates placing it operational in 2015, this makes fruition of the Nabucco pipeline less likely, and therefore reduces the opportunity for Georgia to collect increased transit fees that would have ensued, were Nabucco to materialize. With the North Stream pipeline already functional between Germany and Russia, this new pipeline will further cement EU reliance on Russian energy sources and reduce the likelihood that the EU has the ability to put any measurable pressure on Russia over Georgian issues.
The longer Georgia waits to engage Russia, the more leverage that Russia gains over the EU because of energy and trade dependence, which will put Russia in a stronger position to completely rebuff any Georgian overtures. The situation is already tough for Georgia. Three Georgia can lift itself above the occupation topic and engage Russia. The situation will not resolve itself without engagement. Though these are clearly not identical situations, no two conflicts are alike, and in fact, the United States did not give any "occupied" land back to
England after the Revolutionary War. England could easily argue that the United States is occupying lands that are historically theirs, but they do not.
Some will argue that on-going territorial occupation resulting in hundreds of thousands of displaced citizens is more egregious than the killing of millions in wars decades ago. However, it is hard to equate any offense higher than the tens of millions killed between Germany and Russia, and Russia"s subsequent annexation of parts of Germany for 40+ years after WWII.
Those countries are considered friends now by most observers. Georgia can also overcome the unpleasant aspects of their history with Russia as well.
It was possibly a political miscalculation on President Saakashvili"s part to make controlling the territories a central tenet of his political platform. However, Medvedev and Putin may have actually done Saakashvili a favor by declaring the regions independent, thereby transferring all of the instability, risk and financial exposure to Russia, away from Georgia. If Georgia were to cede their rights to these regions, it would eliminate the border dispute, and perhaps pave a more 22 expeditious path to eventual acceptance into either NATO or the EU. Ceding these territories does not mean they can never return to Georgia. But, Georgia should be cautious and temper expectations, as solving its border disputes with Russia is only one of many other hurdles remaining to NATO or EU admission. Georgia did everything within its capability to protect the Georgians in these regions and to keep their territory, including facing off with the full military force of Russia. But it is a losing proposition for any nation confronting such a huge numerical hurdle, and that numerical disadvantage will not change. Without security guarantees from other nations, Georgia is at Russia"s mercy.
The territories do not currently want to join Georgia, and force won"t solve this. Georgia has There isn"t a Georgian Diaspora in these regions to pressure local politicians, so there is little attraction. The regions are lost to Georgia for the foreseeable future, and Georgia should be prepared to advance without them. Georgia was not an independent nation for more than a few years over the past two hundred years between 1800 and 1990. Georgia did not have control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for at least 20 years, so it is a 24 tough challenge to say they were taken by force in 2008, when they were essentially already gone. 68 International recognition does not alter this reality.
Conclusion:
Georgia must reengage Russia without preconditions, especially the de-occupation of Abkhazia and Ossetia, while maintaining close but more subtle contact with the West. It cannot rely solely on Western institutions to ensure its economic development and cannot expect
Western assurances of its physical security. They should manage their expectations with respect to Western aspirations and shift towards normalizing diplomatic relations with Russian. Of course, this path has risks, since Soviet attitudes and politics still permeate some of the postSoviet space, but risks of inaction are greater. Western goals will never be realized with consistent Russian interference as a result of Georgian antagonism. Additionally, the West lacks national interests significant enough to assure Georgian security guarantees. Trenin wrote that Russia wanted to have a sphere of interest, but not a sphere of influence, 69 insinuating that Russia does not require a dominant role in its neighbor"s affairs, and recent experience in Central Asia and other areas suggest this is feasible.
Individual EU country bilateral agreements with Russia and their dependency on its energy sources and trade markets are problematic for Georgia. The United States has significant budget constraints, a military drawdown, and renewed efforts to tighten relations with Russia, with the view that all nations will benefit, not just Georgia. It is unlikely that the EU has the resources to further the Georgian cause beyond supportive public statements, humanitarian and economic financial aid, and low-impact defensive military hardware. NATO membership must be recognized as a distant goal. There is simply no threat large enough to motivate NATO members to expand the alliance any further under current affairs. Because of these headwinds, Georgia must engage Russia positively to assure their benevolence, while sustaining Western support. This is their best chance to in peace and harmony in a very volatile region. Once Georgia normalizes with both East and West, it will achieve its true potential.
Endnotes:
1 Rubin, Eric, "The South Caucasus: 20 Years of Independence," Speech at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace Conference, Nov 28, 2011. Paragraph 9, discusses the remarkable transformation in Georgia.
